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GRUTTER’S DENOUEMENT: THREE TEMPLATES 




This month, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin,1 a case that is widely expected to end race-
based affirmative action in higher education. A decade ago, Grutter v. 
Bollinger2 upheld that practice, holding that public universities and colleges 
could lawfully include race as one factor in admissions decisions to foster 
racial diversity on campus. At the time, the Court speculated that such 
diversity would be achieved in twenty-five years and that race-based 
affirmative action thus would no longer be necessary in 2028.3 The Roberts 
Court now appears ready to ditch the practice much sooner. 
This prospect should come as no surprise. Vulnerable from the start, 
Grutter was the product of a deeply divided Court and has lacked majority 
support among the Justices ever since its author, Justice O’Connor, retired 
in 2005. Since then, the Roberts Court has voiced its hostility to race-based 
criteria in a host of contexts and has also repeatedly shown its willingness 
to displace precedent it dislikes.4 Adding the fact that Fisher contains none 
of the characteristics that typically justify Supreme Court review and it 
looks like a safe bet that the Roberts Court did not take the case to affirm 
the wisdom of diversity-seeking affirmative action. It is far more likely that 
it will use Fisher as a vehicle to condemn Grutter and the type of 
decisionmaking it fosters. 
What remains to be seen is precisely how the Roberts Court will 
express that condemnation. Many anticipate the Court to scrap Grutter 
entirely.5 Still, overruling the case is not the only means by which the Court 
might voice its objections to the Grutter framework. In fact, recent 
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decisions show the Roberts Court responding in three very different ways 
when confronted with precedent it disfavors. Each presents a plausible 
template for resolving Fisher. 
I. GIVING NOTICE: THE NAMUDNO TEMPLATE 
Most narrowly, the Court might decide to use Fisher to issue a 
warning, much like it did in 2009 when it sidestepped a constitutional 
challenge to the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO)6 addressed a provision 
of the VRA that requires jurisdictions with a history of voting 
discrimination to obtain federal approval prior to changing any aspect of 
their voting laws.7 The Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld the provision,8 
but by 2009 questions had arisen as to whether it was still justified. Writing 
for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts seemed quite skeptical that it was 
justified and listed reason after reason why the statutory provision appeared 
constitutionally infirm.9 
His opinion nevertheless opted not to throw out the statute. Instead, the 
Chief Justice simply rewrote the statute, holding that the plaintiff could 
apply for a statutory exemption for which it had previously seemed to be 
flatly ineligible.10 
That statutory construction, contrived as it was, not only enabled the 
Court to avoid a constitutional ruling, but also provided the Justices a 
mechanism through which to issue a warning. NAMUDNO put Congress on 
notice, making it clear that the Justices stand ready to scrap the statute in 
the next case unless something significant about the statutory regime has 
changed by then. In other words, the NAMUDNO Court’s criticism of the 
VRA, while technically dicta, might be better understood as the operative 
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  557 U.S. 193 (2009) (link). 
7
  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (link). 
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  See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 519 U.S. 9 (1996) (link); City of Rome v. United States, 446 
U.S. 156 (1980) (link); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (link). 
9
  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 201–04 (noting the “substantial ‘federalism costs’” Section 5 exacts, its 
broad application to all electoral changes “however innocuous,” the fact that “[t]hings have changed in 
the South,” that the racial gap in voter registration and turnout rates is diminished and in places 
nonexistent, that minority candidates hold elected office “at unprecedented levels,” that “[b]latantly 
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare,” the dated character of the coverage formula, its 
weak relation to current conditions, and the fact that the distinct burdens imposed on covered 
jurisdictions “may no longer” be warranted). 
10
  The Voting Rights Act allows a “political subdivision” to seek this exemption, but defines a 
“political subdivision” in terms that facially exclude the plaintiff in NAMUDNO. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(a) (link). The Austin water district was neither a county nor a state subdivision “which conducts 
registration for voting” when the county does not. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (defining “political 
subdivision” under the VRA) (link). 
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holding—one that strikes down the statute but stays the order until the next 
case in which the question is presented.11 
Were the Court to follow this template in Fisher, it would issue an 
opinion spelling out why the Justices think the diversity Grutter celebrated 
no longer provides sufficient justification for the use of race. Fisher would 
nevertheless stop short of overturning Grutter. Instead, it would find some 
alternative means to dispose of the case, with mootness being the most 
likely candidate.12 True, the University’s claim that the case is moot is far 
from unassailable, but it is no more implausible than the statutory reading 
the Court constructed as an exit strategy in NAMUDNO. 
Fisher might, accordingly, opt to follow NAMUDNO by outlining the 
Court’s objections to Grutter and then disposing of the case on a distinct 
ground. Doing so would give notice to school administrators at the 
University of Texas and elsewhere that the Supreme Court presently views 
reliance on race in the admissions process as deeply flawed. The message 
would be clear: Change your programs now or be assured that the Court 
will change them for you in the next case. 
School administrators might respond by scaling back the ways in 
which they use race to promote diversity. Were they to do so, the Court 
would have avoided the need to issue a divisive constitutional ruling. But 
even if they opt to stay the course, much like Congress has done with regard 
to the VRA, the NAMUDNO template might still prove an attractive one to 
use in Fisher. 
First, NAMUDNO postponed resolution of the constitutional question 
and thus allowed the VRA’s regional provisions to remain operational for 
an additional redistricting cycle. That cycle, in turn, has yielded a host of 
developments that illuminate the statute’s operation in ways that may prove 
beneficial to the Court when the Justices revisit the issue.13 Second, 
NAMUDNO provided a measured first response to a contentious issue that 
promises to temper the charges of activism that will inevitably follow 
should the Court ultimately decide to strike down the provision. 
Following the NAMUDNO template in Fisher might yield similar 
benefits even if school administrators leave existing affirmative action plans 
unaltered. Allowing Grutter more time to operate may expand our 
understanding about the administration and operation of diversity-
promoting programs. Also, reliance on the NAMUDNO template might 
lessen charges of activism should the Court ultimately decide to displace 
Grutter as precedent. 
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  See Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO: A Response to Professor Amar, 61 FLA. 
L. REV. 991, 998 (2009) (link); Ellen D. Katz, Leave It Up to Congress, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 13, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429774549. 
12
  See Brief in Opposition, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2011) 
(No. 11-345) (link). 
13
  As they are sure to do. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), petition 
for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 20, 2012) (No. 12-96). 
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Still, critical differences between the two cases make the Roberts Court 
unlikely to use the NAMUDNO template in Fisher. NAMUDNO presented a 
constitutional challenge to a highly salient, albeit poorly understood, federal 
statute; one that the Court had repeatedly sustained and expressly preserved 
in the very line of cases that presently render the VRA so vulnerable.14 The 
Roberts Court no doubt felt inclined to tread lightly, as NAMUDNO itself 
reflects. The Justices are apt to feel less constrained in Fisher. Diversity-
based affirmative action in higher education has a very different pedigree 
than the VRA, and the Court has already specifically aired and addressed 
the precise legal arguments supporting and opposing the practice.15 As a 
result, the Roberts Court may feel more freedom to rule expansively in 
Fisher than it did in NAMUDNO. 
II. OVERRULING GRUTTER: THE CITIZENS UNITED TEMPLATE 
Ruling most expansively, of course, would mean that the Court would 
do what it is widely expected to do in Fisher: use the case as the vehicle to 
overrule Grutter. Should the Court follow this course, it would disavow 
Grutter’s core holding that “student body diversity is a compelling state 
interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”16 Fisher 
would hold that fostering diversity is not a compelling interest and hence 
not sufficiently weighty to justify the use of race-based criteria to achieve it. 
That is, Fisher would bar school administrators from considering a 
student’s race when making admissions decisions by rejecting the very 
interest the Court upheld in 2003 as sufficient to justify the admissions 
policy under challenge. 
The Roberts Court has issued a decision of this structure previously.  
Two years ago in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,17 the 
Court disavowed a governmental interest it had only recently upheld as 
sufficient justification for a challenged regulation. At issue in Citizens 
United was the application of a federal statute that limited certain forms of 
corporate speech in advance of an election.18 Back in 2003, McConnell v. 
FEC upheld the statute, finding that Congress’s interest in preventing both 
corruption and the more inchoate “appearance of corruption” provided 
 
14
  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (distinguishing the statute under 
challenge from the regional provisions of the VRA). 
15
  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
16
  Id. at 325. 
17
  130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (link). 
18
  See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006) (barring corporations and unions from using their general treasury 
funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for 
speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate) (link); see also id. § 434(f)(3) 
(defining electioneering communication as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that 
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within thirty days of a primary 
election) (link). 
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adequate justification for it.19 Citizens United, however, announced that 
Congress’s legitimate regulatory interest was far more limited and extended 
only to the prevention of so-called “quid pro quo corruption.”20 Finding that 
the disputed statute did nothing to advance this more circumscribed interest, 
Citizens United struck down the statute as unconstitutional and overturned 
portions of McConnell that held otherwise.21 
By renouncing an interest that was recently deemed sufficient to justify 
a challenged regulation, Citizens United offers a template for resolving 
Fisher should the Roberts Court now be inclined to disavow diversity. Just 
as Citizens United deemed the governmental interest in curbing influence—
as opposed to outright bribery—insufficient to justify the challenged limits 
on corporate speech, the Fisher Court might similarly discard diversity as a 
governmental interest sufficient to warrant the race-based decisionmaking 
Grutter sanctioned. 
Admittedly, the structural connection between what Citizens United 
did and what Fisher might do is obscured by the distinct subject matter 
addressed in the two cases. But the connection is a real one. Indeed, the 
widespread belief that Fisher will scrap Grutter necessarily posits—albeit 
implicitly—that Fisher will follow the Citizens United template. By virtue 
of existing doctrine, any ruling that bars school administrators from 
considering a student’s race when making admissions decisions would also 
need to discard the interest that presently justifies such reliance. And if the 
Roberts Court wants to jettison diversity, it knows how to do so because it 
did something structurally similar in Citizens United. 
Still, the Roberts Court may be more reluctant to follow the Citizens 
United template in Fisher than those predicting Grutter’s demise generally 
allow. True, the personnel changes that enabled the Citizens United Court to 
overrule McConnell so quickly also suggest a Court prone to scrap Grutter 
in a similar fashion. And yet, the extensive and ongoing criticism Citizens 
United generated may have tempered the Justices’ enthusiasm for projects 
of this sort.22 
Even if it remains undeterred, the Fisher Court may reject the Citizens 
United template simply because it lacks the votes to overturn Grutter using 
it. In particular, Justice Kennedy’s support for doing so is far from certain. 
 
19
  540 U.S. 93, 156 (2003) (link). 
20
  130 S. Ct. at 910. 
21
  Id. at 910–11. 
22
  See, e.g., Nick Baumann, Grayson: Court’s Campaign Finance Decision “Worst Since Dred 
Scott”, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 22, 2010, 5:00 AM PST), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/01/grayson-
courts-campaign-finance-decision-worst-dredd-scott (link); Bob Edgar, Op-Ed, Supreme Court’s 
Campaign Ruling: A Bad Day for Democracy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0122/Supreme-Court-s-campaign-ruling-a-bad-
day-for-democracy (link); Press Release, Org. for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Head of OSCE 
Election Body Concerned About U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Election Spending (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/51838 (link). 
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He has, to be sure, repeatedly objected to the ways in which public 
decisionmakers use race in a host of contexts, including his dissent in 
Grutter.23 But even as he has done so, Justice Kennedy has been careful to 
avoid condemning the goals that underlie such projects. Thus, in his Grutter 
dissent, Justice Kennedy called for more exacting scrutiny of the process by 
which “a university’s compelling interest in a diverse student body [may] 
be achieved.”24 Four years later, he emphasized that, “[d]iversity, depending 
on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school 
district may pursue,” even as he voted to strike down the race-based 
policies two school districts used to assign students to particular schools.25 
Needless to say, such statements do not preclude Justice Kennedy from 
now voting to overturn Grutter using the Citizens United template. He may 
now be convinced that promoting diversity is a flawed project and doomed 
to fail regardless of the means selected to promote it. But were Justice 
Kennedy to so hold, he would need to disavow not only Grutter’s 
recognition that diversity constitutes a compelling interest, but also his own 
statements to that effect and the distinct doctrinal path his own opinions 
have charted. 
III. POLICING MEANS, NOT ENDS: THE KENNEDY TEMPLATE 
In a series of opinions, Justice Kennedy has mapped out a third 
template the Court might follow in Fisher. His dissent in Grutter v. 
Bollinger,26 his concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,27 and his recent opinion for the 
Court in Ricci v. DeStefano28 all demand that the Court closely police the 
means by which public officials use race in decisionmaking processes. 
These opinions nevertheless either explicitly affirm or simply leave 
undisturbed the recognized legitimacy of the specific goal advanced by the 
challenged race-based criteria. 
In 2003, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter made it clear that he 
viewed the flaw in the Michigan program to be one of means, rather than 
ends. While he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent—and thus agreed 
that the law school’s program involved more rigid racial balancing than the 
majority had allowed—Justice Kennedy separately acknowledged the 
 
23
  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–95 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Rice v. 
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden 
classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by 
his or her own merit and essential qualities.”) (link). 
24
  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
25
  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (link). 
26
  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
27
  551 U.S. at 782–98 (Kennedy. J., concurring). 
28
  557 U.S. 557 (2009) (link). 
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legitimacy of the underlying goal, noting both “a university’s compelling 
interest in a diverse student body”29 and the established bases for “the 
Court’s acceptance of a university’s considered judgment that racial 
diversity among students can further its educational task.” 30 
Five years later, Justice Kennedy again parsed means from ends in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. In 
dispute were programs implemented by two school districts to increase 
racial diversity and avoid what school administrators called racial isolation.  
In a 5–4 ruling, the Court held that the programs, which assigned students 
to particular elementary and secondary schools based on their race, 
amounted to unconstitutional racial balancing.31 Justice Kennedy provided 
the critical fifth vote for this ruling, but he did not join Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion in full. Instead, he wrote separately to explain 
why he believed the student assignment plans were flawed. One plan, he 
wrote, had been implemented haphazardly with what he saw as nebulous 
standards and inadequate oversight, while the other plan relied on racial 
categories so broad that it threatened to undermine the very diversity it was 
seeking to achieve.32 In other words, Justice Kennedy objected to the means 
by which school administrators sought to achieve their goals, rather than to 
the goals themselves. 
Justice Kennedy, in fact, explicitly stated that he believed those goals 
were lawful. He wrote: “Diversity, depending on its meaning and definition, 
is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.”33 He added 
that school administrators could permissibly use race-based criteria in 
carefully tailored ways to address problems like “de facto resegregation in 
schooling” and “racial isolation in schools.”34 For Justice Kennedy, the 
problem in Parents Involved was not that school districts were pursuing 
flimsy or even destructive goals, but instead that they failed to tailor their 
programs adequately to achieve the worthwhile ends they sought. 
Justice Kennedy again invoked this distinction between means and 
ends in his opinion for the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano.35 In this case, city 
officials in New Haven had claimed that Title VII’s disparate impact 
provision required that they scrap a promotional exam for firefighters after 
test results revealed that no African-American firefighters would have been 
promoted. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion disagreed with this claim, 
holding that New Haven lacked a sufficiently sound basis upon which to 
 
29
  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
30
  Id. at 387–88. 
31
  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732–35. 
32
  Id. at 784–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
33
  Id. at 783. 
34
  Id. at 788. 
35
  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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conclude disparate impact liability would have followed had it certified the 
test results.36 
Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia agreed, but added that no amount of 
evidence would have sufficed to justify the city’s decision because city 
officials had been pursuing an unlawful end. Justice Alito believed city 
officials simply wanted to placate a vocal racial constituency and he 
condemned as impermissible the racial pandering he understood to be 
animating the city’s decision.37 For his part, Justice Scalia objected 
categorically to Title VII’s disparate impact inquiry, suggesting that the 
race consciousness that unavoidably inheres in it is irreconcilable with 
statutory and constitutional commands regarding equal treatment.38 Justice 
Kennedy, however, held the Court to a narrower ruling by finding error in 
the means by which the city made its decision (namely the insufficiency of 
the evidence) but decidedly not in the project it was pursuing.39 
Taken together, Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Grutter, Parents 
Involved, and Ricci suggest a template the Court might use in Fisher. The 
Kennedy template would require the Court to examine with rigor the 
distinct ways administrators at the University of Texas (UT) presently use 
racial criteria to pursue their goal of racial diversity on campus. It would 
nevertheless leave undisturbed Grutter’s recognition that the goal of racial 
diversity is a compelling objective that school administrators may lawfully 
pursue. 
Under the Kennedy template, two aspects of the Texas program are 
particularly vulnerable. The first is the targeted way UT administrators use 
racial criteria to promote racial diversity not only in the entering class, but 
also at the classroom and program level. The second is the decision to use 
Grutter’s “holistic review” in conjunction with its 10% plan, under which 
UT guarantees admissions to all students who graduate in the top 10% of 
their high school class. Both aspects of the Texas program raised concerns 
in the lower courts.40 
These components of the UT program look vulnerable under the 
Kennedy template. While a strong argument exists that the benefits of 
diversity identified in Grutter require that it extend to the classroom and 
program level, the means by which such diversity is achieved involves 
targeted racial moves of a sort likely to displease anyone employing the 
Kennedy template. Recall Justice Kennedy’s discomfort with what he 
believed was an unduly rigid use of race in Grutter, and again in Parents 
 
36
  Id. at 585. 
37
  Id. at 598–605 (Alito, J., concurring). 
38
  Id. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
39
  Id. at 585. 
40
  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, J., dissenting from the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (link); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially concurring) (link). 
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Involved and it is easy to envision the charge of racial balancing in an 
opinion striking down UT’s effort to achieve classroom-level diversity. 
So too, under the Kennedy template, the Court would likely look 
skeptically at UT’s decision to employ Grutter-style review in conjunction 
with its 10% plan. The likely objection here would not be the arguable 
rigidity with which UT is using racial criteria, but instead the claim it needs 
to use race at all. True, UT has a solid argument that, standing alone, the 
10% plan offers an inadequate substitute for the flexibility and 
individualized attentions promised by Grutter’s holistic rule.  And yet, the 
fact that UT admits a greater proportion of minority students under the 10% 
plan than outside of it will fuel concern that the use of race is not necessary 
to achieve the diversity of the sort Grutter protects.41 
Back in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy complained that the school 
districts’ race-based policies did little to foster the diversity school 
administrators sought. In Fisher, one can imagine him raising a similar 
complaint. If the facially race-neutral 10% plan more effectively fosters 
diversity than a race-conscious one, why not rely on, or expand if 
necessary, the 10% plan rather than employ less effective racial criteria to 
achieve the same purpose? Or so an opinion relying on the Kennedy 
template might posit. 
Such an opinion would overrule the lower court and strike down UT’s 
program. But it would leave standing Grutter’s recognition that diversity is 
a compelling interest and the specific means Grutter held could be used to 
achieve that diversity. Individualized holistic review of the sort once used at 
the University of Michigan Law School would remain a constitutionally 
permissible means to admit a racially diverse incoming class. Nothing in 
Fisher would be to the contrary, as the decision would be limited to the 
ways in which the UT program exceeds the bounds of what Grutter had 
approved. 
It is worth remembering that Abigail Fisher’s petition to the Supreme 
Court made precisely this point. While ultimately calling for Grutter to be 
overruled, the petition focused more on the ways in which UT’s program 
goes beyond the boundaries of what Grutter itself deemed permissible.42 
Reliance on the Kennedy template would likely lead the Court to agree. 
Undeniably, such a decision would be far-reaching, both in Texas and 
beyond. The Kennedy template is a sweeping one, and appears a moderate 
stance only when compared with the Court’s approach in cases like Citizens 
United. Application of the Kennedy template in Parents Involved and Ricci 
left considerable destruction in its wake, sharply circumscribing local 
discretion to consider race in a host of critical decisions. And yet reliance 
on the Kennedy template in Fisher would yield a ruling that would be less 
 
41
  See, e.g., Fisher, 631 F.3d at 239. 
42
  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Sept. 
15, 2011) (No. 11-345) (link). 
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transformative than most anticipate. It would not eliminate affirmative 
action entirely, which Fisher is widely expected to do. Indeed, school 
administrators would remain free to consider race in admissions precisely 
so long as they do so the way administrators at the University of Michigan 
Law School once did and avoid the distinct practices used at the University 
of Texas. 
CONCLUSION 
The Roberts Court will likely use Fisher as a vehicle to criticize 
affirmative action. It may, as many expect, take the opportunity to overrule 
Grutter entirely. Citizens United provides the template for doing so—
instructions, so to speak, to disavow a governmental interest only recently 
upheld as sufficient justification for a challenged regulation. But overruling 
Grutter is not the only way to resolve Fisher. The NAMUDNO template 
offers a more measured response to a contentious issue and a forum in 
which to voice criticism and provide guidance. So too, the Kennedy 
template’s focus on means rather than ends allows for a more targeted 
response than does Citizen United and provides the means to excise what 
the Court may find most objectionable about UT’s practice. 
As is true with many cases, the outcome in Fisher appears to lie with 
Justice Kennedy’s vote. To be sure, the same was said about the fate of the 
Affordable Care Act, which, it turns out, survived constitutional scrutiny 
despite Justice Kennedy’s vehement opposition to the statute.43 That Fisher 
might similarly surprise is possible, but that result is highly unlikely. Far 
more probable is that Fisher will find fault with the affirmative action 
program at UT with Justice Kennedy providing the deciding vote as to why. 
What proves to be the fatal flaw remains to be seen. 
Prior precedent makes clear that Justice Kennedy is no fan of 
affirmative action and he may decide the time has come to scrap the 
practice entirely. But that outcome is hardly certain, for reasons Justice 
Kennedy himself has articulated. His opinions evince no enthusiasm for 
race-based decisionmaking of any sort, but neither do they suggest a 
willingness to clear the deck entirely. 
And it is this caution, displayed most decisively in Parents Involved, 
that may wind up restraining the Court now. In that case, it was Justice 
Kennedy who insisted that the plurality’s mantra that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race,” was “not sufficient to decide these cases.”44 And it was Justice 
Kennedy who described rigid color-blindness as too unyielding a practice. 
The Government, Justice Kennedy wrote, has a “legitimate interest . . . in 
 
43
  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (link). 
44
  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”45 Time 





  Id. at 787–88. 
